This book is an accessible, but deeply thought-provoking look at the United Kingdom’s 1975 referendum on Britain’s membership of the European Community. It places that referendum, and Britain’s relationship with the Community, in their historical context looking at Britain’s post-war relationship with Europe, the reasons why Britain chose not to join the initial six, the subsequent decision to join, and the reasons for the 1974/5 renegotiation and referendum. The book also looks at the conduct of the campaign as well as subsequent developments in Britain’s relationship with the Community (later the Union). The 2016 referendum and its very different outcome run throughout the book.
The breadth of perspective in this book alone makes it a worthwhile read for those with an interest in Brexit.
Key takeaways from the book for me were
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• The United Kingdom’s decision to not join the Communities in 1951 or 1957 occurred at a time when Britain had substantial institutional and military links with both the European Continent (eg the Council of Europe) and the wider world, in particular the United States and the Commonwealth.
• Key differences between the United Kingdom and the original six EEC members were the historical legacy of the Second World War (all of the six had been either invaded or defeated and occupied during the war and had suffered devastating physical and institutional damage). At the time of the Treaties of Rome, British trade with the Commonwealth substantially exceeded trade with the initial six members. Further, until well in the 1960’s and 1970’s, the initial six Community members had enormous parts of their populations in agriculture.
• The timing of the 1975 vote was a crucial factor in its success. The referendum occurred only thirty years from the end of the second World War, and “only” 57 years after the end of the first. By contrast the 2016 referendum occurred 71 years from the ending of World War II. Further, the warnings of economic catastrophe resulting from withdrawal were far more believable to voters in the precarious economic conditions of the 1970’s. Perhaps most importantly, the referendum occurred only shortly after the innovation of the European Council (regular meetings of Heads of State (or Government) which had emerged as the key governing entity in the Community. Both France (under Giscard) and Germany (under Schmidt) substantially downplayed further moves to a closer Union of the member States. The massive price-shocks and economic instability of the 1970’s blunted the impact of Community membership on food prices.
• By contrast, the moves to complete the Single Market (spearheaded by the Thatcher government), introduction of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, the emergence of a strong Commission under Jacques Delors and the revived moves towards Economic and Monetary Union and the moves to German reunification at the end of the Cold War created a wholly different context by the beginning of the 1990’s.
• The Labour Government’s strategy in its 1975/6 renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s membership was based primarily on convincing Labour voters that it was appropriate for them to vote in favour of membership, notwithstanding the party’s previous opposition to membership, without altering the fundamental structure of the Community. By contrast, David Cameron’s renegotiation focused on “big picture” issues such as freedom of movement and “ever closer union” that went to the heart of the EU.
• Prime Minister Harold Wilson was somewhat ambivalent about Community membership, and while in favour of a Yes vote, left the leadership of the Yes Campaign in the hands of Home Secretary Roy Jenkins and former (Tory) Prime Minister Edward Heath and Liberal leader Jeremy Thorpe. This allowed Wilson to appear more impartial, and assisted with maintaining the unity of the Government. (The contrast with Cameron’s role in the 2016 referendum is obvious).
• The referendum ultimately only postponed the split in the Labour Party between the left and the future SDP.
• All three leaders of the Yes Campaign, Roy Jenkins, Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe found themselves ultimately sidelined in British politics.
• The writer debunks the idea that sovereignty and the broader implications of membership were not canvassed in the referendum, but notes that it was not an issue that gained much resonance in the campaign. The writer notes that the No campaign itself focussed on issues such as food prices and shied away from addressing sovereignty, in light of the community disengagement with this issue.
• While the financial resources, in both referenda, of the Remain side were significantly greater, it seems that the Vote Leave campaigners in 2016 drew significant lessons from the 1975 campaign. In 1975, Britain In Europe, the yes campaign, worked significantly to target its message across a range of different political, social, national, ethnic and professional groups whereas the No campaign was beset by the significant political differences between on the one hand Tony Benn and Michael Foot, and Enoch Powell on the other. On the other hand in 2016 the Vote Leave and Leave.EU Campaigns effectively complemented each other in 2016 (notwithstanding some tensions between the two groups), and the Remain campaign struggled to effectively manage the differences between the Conservative and non-Conservative Remain supporters.
• A highly significant point of difference between the United Kingdom and other countries in the Community/Union, was the lack of any real significant national achievement for the United Kingdom flowing from, or happening simultaneously with, membership of the Community/Union. For example the initial six re-constructed after the war and then experienced significant economic growth. Spain, Portugal and Greece made the transition into successful democracies from their authoritarian regimes. And, the nations of Eastern Europe joined after the end of the Cold War and the end of the Soviet Union. This meant that the benefits to the United Kingdom of being in the European Union were substantially more difficult to see.
I would highly recommend this volume to anyone with an interest in the 2016 referendum outcome.
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Top reviews from other countries
D Hughes
An excellent and detailed insight into the previous referendum that everyone has forgotten.
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on March 28, 2024
P R GHOSH
A book for everyone with a serious interest in Britain and her recent history
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on June 3, 2018Don Fulano de Tal
Fascinating account of the 1970s environment
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on January 2, 2020CVAR
Absolutely fascinating, and well researched, account of the ...
Reviewed in the United Kingdom on July 8, 2018